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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 In this case, the American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company ("AT&T") seeks to hold the defendants-appellees -- 
Winback and Conserve Program, Inc. ("Winback") and Alphonse G. 
Inga -- liable for acts of unfair competition by the defendants' 
sales representatives.  The district court, in an Opinion and 
Order dated May 12, 1994, denied AT&T's application for a 
preliminary injunction, finding that Winback and Inga exerted 
insufficient control over the sales representatives to justify 
the imposition of liability upon Winback and Inga.  AT&T v. 
Winback & Conserve Program, 851 F. Supp. 617 (D.N.J. 1994) 
("Winback").  Because we find that the district court committed 
errors of law in denying AT&T's motion for a preliminary 
  
injunction against Winback and Inga, we will vacate the Order of 
the district court and we will remand the matter for further 
proceedings.  
 
 I.  Introduction and Factual Background1 
 AT&T is a long-distance telecommunications carrier 
that, as part of its marketing strategy, uses a variety of 
service marks and trademarks, including the initials "AT&T" and 
the AT&T "globe" symbol.  AT&T markets and sells 
telecommunications services to customers, and its rates and 
practices are governed by tariffs it files with the Federal 
Communications Commission.  Not only does AT&T provide services 
to "end-users" -- customers who purchase service for themselves -
- but, pursuant to a 1976 FCC ruling, AT&T offers long distance 
telecommunications services it provides under a tariff for 
resale.  See In the Matter of Regulatory Policies Concerning 
Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Services and Facilities, 
60 F.C.C.2d 261 (1976); In the Matter of Regulatory Policies 
Concerning Resale and Shared Use of Common Carrier Domestic 
Public Switched Network Services, 83 F.C.C.2d 167 (1980); 
Winback, 851 F. Supp. at 618.  The resale market works as 
follows:  Resellers, or aggregators, subscribe to AT&T programs 
which provide large discounts for high volume purchases of AT&T 
                     
1
.  Unless otherwise noted, the facts set forth in the text are 
taken from the district court's Opinion in this case, reported at 
851 F. Supp. 617 (D.N.J. 1994). 
  
telecommunications services.  The resellers then sell the 
services to individual businesses that do not generate sufficient  
volume to qualify individually for the high-volume discounts.  
Thus, by providing the services to these end-users, resellers 
make a profit while end-users receive access to the AT&T network 
at a significantly lower cost than if they purchased services 
from AT&T directly.  Under some programs -- including the one at 
issue on this appeal -- AT&T bills the end-users directly and 
they make payments directly to AT&T.  Also, pursuant to some 
resale agreements, the end-users receive the services associated 
with access to the AT&T network directly from AT&T.2  
Nonetheless, in the resale business, only the reseller is a 
customer of AT&T; the end-users are customers of the reseller and 
not of AT&T. 
 Appellee Winback is a reseller of 800 inbound 
telecommunications services and appellee Inga is its president.  
As a matter of convenience, hereafter we usually will refer to 
both simply as Winback.  Winback offers end-users access to the 
AT&T 800 inbound network at a discount price.  As are other 
resellers, Winback is both a customer and a competitor of AT&T. 
 This case really began in April 1992, when AT&T filed a 
complaint and application for a temporary restraining order 
alleging that one of Inga's other companies, One Stop Financial, 
Inc., was infringing on AT&T's trademarks and service marks, 
                     
2
.  This is accomplished by the reseller's issuance of a letter 
of agency.  Winback, 851 F. Supp. at 619. 
  
falsely representing that it was affiliated with AT&T and passing 
itself off as AT&T.3  The parties resolved the case by entering 
into a Consent Final Order and Injunction, filed on May 7, 1992, 
which enjoined One Stop and its officers, directors, employees 
and agents from engaging in such practices.4  In September 1993, 
AT&T filed a motion to hold One Stop in civil contempt of the 
Consent Order.  One Stop and Inga defended by arguing that their 
sales and marketing representatives, over whom One Stop had no 
control, were responsible for any infringing acts.5  
Consequently, as a result of AT&T's application, on September 27, 
1993, the Final Order and Injunction was amended to obligate One 
Stop to serve each of its sales agents with a copy of the Order, 
and, in turn, to obligate each of the primary agents to serve the 
Order upon all subagents they had authorized to market under the 
name One Stop Financial, Inc. 
 Soon after the amended Final Order was filed, AT&T 
filed a second application to hold One Stop and Inga in contempt, 
this time basing its claim for relief on allegedly infringing 
activity on the part of Winback, Inga's other company (and the 
corporate defendant in the instant action).  Winback, 851 F. 
Supp. at 620.  The district court informed the parties that the 
motion for contempt would not be heard until discovery was 
                     
3
.  AT&T v. One Stop Fin., Inc., No. 92-1489 (D.N.J.) (NHP).  See 
AT&T Brief at 3. 
4
.  See AT&T Complaint ¶48 at app. at 20; Winback Answer ¶48 at 
app. 379. 
5
.  See AT&T Brief at 4. 
  
completed.  AT&T responded by filing this action, on December 13, 
1993, against Winback and Inga, alleging false designation of 
origin, passing off, and unprivileged imitation in violation of 
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, as well as 
various state common law claims.  AT&T sought, among other 
relief, temporary restraints, and preliminary and permanent 
injunctions.  The district court held a hearing on AT&T's 
application for a temporary restraining order on December 15, 
1993.  See Order To Show Cause With Temporary Restraints, app. at 
366.  On December 17, 1993, the district court issued a temporary 
restraining order enjoining and restraining "Defendants, together 
with their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys and 
all persons in active concert or participation with them" from: 
 (a) employing any oral communication, 
advertisement, label, sign, flyer, envelope 
or correspondence or any other written 
documentation that falsely designates the 
origin of Defendants' goods or services as 
being those of the American Telephone and 
Telegraph Company or of AT&T, or that is 
likely to cause confusion as to whether 
Defendants' goods or services are sponsored 
by, or affiliated with the American Telephone 
and Telegraph Company;  
 
 (b) engaging, producing, creating, 
encouraging, aiding or abetting any oral 
communication, advertisement, label, sign, 
flyer, envelope, correspondence or any other 
oral or written communication which enables 
Defendants to pass off their goods or 
services as being those of the American 
Telephone and Telegraph Company. 
 
Order to Show Cause at 3-4, app. at 367-68.  The Order prevented 
the defendants and their agents from "introducing into . . . 
  
commerce . . . any document promoting or identifying Winback and 
Conserve Program, Inc., which does not conspicuously identify 
Winback and Conserve Program, Inc. as a corporation through the 
use of the abbreviation, 'Inc.' and which does not identify a 
business mailing address."  Id.  Finally, Winback was ordered to 
serve a copy of the Order upon its primary agents (identified in 
an Appendix to the Order) who in turn were obligated to serve the 
Order on any sub-agents they had employed to do Winback's 
marketing.  The court in that Order set a return date for a 
hearing on AT&T's application for a preliminary injunction.  
Winback answered AT&T's complaint on January 18, 1994.  After 
expedited discovery, full briefing, and the submission of 
detailed affidavits, the district court held a hearing on AT&T's 
application, between March 1 and March 11, 1994. 
 At the hearing, much of the testimony described 
Winback's method of attracting customers.  The evidence 
demonstrated that Winback employs no marketing or sales people on 
its staff.  Rather, it attracts business solely through the use 
of sales networks and/or marketing representatives.  
Specifically, it uses about 50 different marketing agencies, 
which in turn employ or contract with scores more individual 
sales representatives.  The representatives work out of their own 
offices, and receive no supplies, equipment or space from 
Winback.  Winback compensates these representatives purely on a 
commission basis, and the representatives are under no minimum 
obligation to Winback.  Indeed, many representatives market for 
various resellers.  This does not mean, however, that there is 
  
little connection between the agents and Winback.  The agents are 
supplied with forms which AT&T requires to be completed to 
transfer customers to Winback's services (the transfer forms).  
Until October 13, 1993, these forms contained the initials "AT&T" 
and the AT&T globe symbol.  On that date, AT&T ordered the 
resellers to delete those references.  These forms also make 
reference to Winback.  Moreover, at least one of the 
representatives contacts Inga on a regular basis, and Inga 
attempts to "polic[e]" the agents to avoid misrepresentations.  
Winback, 851 F. Supp. at 619. 
 Generally, as the evidence before the district court 
demonstrated, sales representatives contact end-users and present 
them with the Winback plan.  The representatives then send  
prospective customers various forms, including a facsimile cover 
sheet, informational documents, the transfer form, and a Main 
Billed Telephone Numbers Location List ("main billed form").  
Interested end-users complete the transfer form and the main 
billed form and send them back to the representative, who then 
forwards them to the primary marketing or sales agency.  The 
agency, in turn, sends the forms to Winback, which returns them 
to AT&T.  Each month, AT&T sends Winback a check for the 
difference between the discount given Winback by AT&T and the 
average discount Winback passes on to the end-user.  Winback then 
sends commission checks to the various marketing representatives. 
 At the hearing, AT&T presented evidence that end-user 
customers were deceived into believing they were dealing with 
AT&T.  First, many witnesses testified that they received 
  
telephone solicitations by Winback representatives informing them 
that they were affiliated with AT&T.  See, e.g., Winback, 851 F. 
Supp. at 621 (citing testimony of Arthur Sanchez and Daniel 
Flood); certification of Daniel A. Flood at 2, app. 72.  Several 
witnesses also testified that information contained in various 
written materials misled them into believing that Winback was a 
division of AT&T. 
 As an example, one employee of an end-user, Debra 
Vogel, a telecommunications employee of The Toro Company, 
testified that she was confused by a facsimile transmission 
entitled "Winback & Conserve Program for AT&T 800 Customers" that 
she received from a Winback representative.  Because "Winback & 
Conserve Program" was not stated as a separate entity (such as by 
including the letters "Inc." after "Program"), Vogel believed 
that Winback & Conserve Program was a marketing arm of AT&T and 
that the documents she received were official AT&T documents.  
Winback, 851 F. Supp. at 620-21; certification, app. at 36-40.  
More generally, several other end-user customers testified to 
being confused by the following materials they received from 
Winback's sales representatives:  (1) a facsimile cover sheet not 
mentioning Winback but stating that "[w]e are bringing you 
together for less with AT&T network services", see Winback, 851 
F. Supp. at 621; certification of Arthur W. Sanchez at 4 & 
Exhibit A, app. at 58, 61; (2) a facsimile cover sheet entitled 
"The New AT&T 800 Winback & Conserve Program" and stating "Please 
authorize discount acceptance immediately and fax back to 1-800-
251-5491 for forwarding to the AT&T Input Department", see 
  
Winback, 851 F. Supp. at 621-22 (citing testimony of Ekaterina 
Hall, Karen Kelly, Daniel Flood, and Phillip Kenney)6;  (3) the 
transfer form displaying the AT&T initials and globe symbol in 
the corner, id. (citing testimony of Ekaterina Hall, Karen Kelly, 
Arthur Sanchez, Daniel Flood, Thomas Malanga, and Phillip 
Kenney); (4) a main billed form stating "Winback & Conserve 
Program" at the top, id. at 621-23 (citing testimony of Debra 
Dahl Vogel, Ekaterina Hall, Karen Kelly, Phillip Kenney, James 
Angelici and Kay Mills); (5) an information form detailing the 
Winback program and instructing the customer to complete the 
accompanying main billed form "provided to us by AT&T", id. at 
621 (citing testimony of Arthur Sanchez); (6) a form entitled 
"AT&T 800 Readyline Summary of Charges", displaying the AT&T 
initials and globe, id. at 621 (citing testimony of Daniel 
Flood); and (7) several other documents referencing the "Winback 
and Conserve Program".  Id. at 621-23.  Based on the oral 
representations and the written documents, the witnesses 
testified that they believed they were dealing with AT&T's 
Winback and Conserve Program, rather than with a reseller that 
was a separate corporation.  Id. 7  However, the evidence 
indicated that all the allegedly infringing actions were 
performed by the sales agencies or the sales representatives, 
                     
6
.  Apparently, AT&T does not have an input department. 
7
.  As noted above, AT&T originated the transfer form and the 
main billed form, which contain the initials AT&T and the AT&T 
globe symbol.  On October 13, 1993, AT&T ordered all resellers to 
eliminate the AT&T initials and the globe logo from those forms. 
  
without the knowledge, consent, assistance or encouragement of 
Winback or Inga.  Id. at 623. 
 Based on this evidence, the district court found that 
"[t]here is no question that [AT&T] submitted sufficient proofs 
to the Court to establish that consumers have been confused by 
certain oral misrepresentations made by and written documents 
provided by the Winback sales representatives."  Id. at 630.  The 
court then addressed whether Winback and Inga could be held 
responsible for the acts of their sales representatives.  The 
court looked to the common law of torts "to determine the 
boundaries of liability."  Id. at 624.  It then asked whether, 
pursuant to New Jersey law of agency, Winback and/or Inga could 
be held vicariously liable for the torts of their sales agents.  
Relying primarily on a recent New Jersey Supreme Court case 
distinguishing between agents (for whose torts the principal may 
be liable) and independent contractors (for whose torts the 
principal generally may not be held liable), the court found that 
AT&T only had established that the sales representatives were 
independent contractors.  AT&T, in the court's view, had not met 
its burden of proving that Winback and/or Inga exercised 
sufficient control over their sales representatives to constitute 
an agency relationship.  The court primarily relied on the facts 
that the representatives are commissioned rather than salaried, 
that they work on behalf of a number of companies, and that their 
operating expenses and business are purely their own 
responsibilities.  Thus, the court concluded, "the level of joint 
activity between [Winback] and Inga and the sales representatives 
  
is . . . minimal and peripheral to the nuts and bolts of the 
business of marketing and promoting."  Id. at 626.  Furthermore, 
the court found that AT&T contributed to the customers' 
confusion, that the resale business was inherently confusing as 
to the point of origin of the service, and that the public 
interest did not weigh in favor of granting an injunction.  Thus, 
the district court denied AT&T's application for a preliminary 
injunction, and vacated the temporary restraints.  
 AT&T timely filed a notice of appeal from the district 
court's order.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1292(a)(1).  The district court properly exercised jurisdiction 
over AT&T's Lanham Act claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 
1338, and 1367. 
 
 II.  Discussion 
  A.  Standard of Review 
 "[T]he grant of injunctive relief is an extraordinary 
remedy . . . which should be granted only in limited 
circumstances."  Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motors 
Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. 
City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 191 n. 1 (3d Cir. 1980)).  
This proposition is particularly apt in motions for preliminary 
injunctions, when the motion comes before the facts are developed 
to a full extent through the normal course of discovery.  In 
ruling on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the court must 
consider: 
  
 (1) the likelihood that the plaintiff will 
prevail on the merits at final hearing; (2) 
the extent to which the plaintiff is being 
irreparably harmed by the conduct complained 
of; (3) the extent to which the defendant 
will suffer irreparable harm if the 
preliminary injunction is issued; and (4) the 
public interest.  Opticians Ass'n v. 
Independent Opticians, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 
(3d Cir. 1990).  The injunction should issue 
only if the plaintiff produces evidence 
sufficient to convince the district court 
that all four factors favor preliminary 
relief.  Id. at 192. 
 
Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods., 963 F.2d 628, 
632-33 (3d Cir. 1992).8 
 Our review of the district court's decision is limited.  
We must affirm unless, in denying the motion, "'there has been an 
abuse of discretion, an error of law, or a clear mistake in the 
consideration of the proof.'"  Frank's GMC Truck Center, 847 F.2d 
at 101 (quoting Moteles v. University of Pennsylvania, 730 F.2d 
913, 918 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 855, 105 S.Ct. 179 
(1984)).  The scope of our review is narrow because "'the grant 
or denial of a preliminary injunction is almost always based on 
an abbreviated set of facts, requiring a delicate balancing 
                     
8
.  In earlier cases, we have held that these latter two factors 
should be taken into account only when they are relevant.  
Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 197-98 (3d 
Cir. 1990); Morton v. Beyer, 822 F.2d 364, 367 & n.3 (3d Cir. 
1987); Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 1975).  As a 
practical matter, if a plaintiff demonstrates both a likelihood 
of success on the merits and irreparable injury, it almost always 
will be the case that the public interest will favor the 
plaintiff.  Nonetheless, district courts should award preliminary 
injunctive relief only upon weighing all four factors.  See 
Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enter., Ltd., No. 93-3323, 
slip op. at 11 (3d Cir. Nov. 15, 1994).  
  
[that] is the responsibility of the district judge.'"  Frank's 
GMC Truck Center, 847 F.2d at 101-02 (alteration in original) 
(quoting United States Steel Corp. v. Fraternal Ass'n of 
Steelhaulers, 431 F.2d 1046, 1048 (3d Cir. 1970)). 
 Despite the narrow scope of review, "any determination 
that is a prerequisite to the issuance of an injunction . . . is 
reviewed according to the standard applicable to that particular 
determination."  Merchant & Evans, 963 F.2d at 633 (alteration in 
original) (quoting John F. Harkins Co. v. Waldinger Corp., 796 
F.2d 657, 658 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1059, 107 
S.Ct. 939 (1987)).  Therefore, "'[d]espite oft repeated 
statements that the issuance of a preliminary injunction rests in 
the discretion of the trial judge whose decisions will be 
reversed only for "abuse", a court of appeals must reverse if the 
district court has proceeded on the basis of an erroneous view of 
the applicable law.'"  Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer 
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1242 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Donovan v. 
Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 269 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
1069, 103 S.Ct. 488 (1982)), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033, 104 
S.Ct. 690 (1984).  In the final analysis, "[w]e review the 
district court's conclusions of law in a plenary fashion, its 
findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard, and its 
decision to grant or deny an injunction for abuse of discretion."  
Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 




 B.  AT&T's section 43(a) claim 
 1.  Generally 
 The district court focused primarily on whether AT&T 
had demonstrated a "likelihood of success on the merits" and held 
that AT&T had not met its burden by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  We, likewise, will focus on the district court's 
conclusion that AT&T failed to demonstrate a likelihood of 
success on the merits.  As a threshold matter, this appeal 
requires us to decide a question of statutory construction, 
namely, the extent to which federal courts interpreting federal 
statutes may import into such statutes common law doctrines of 
secondary liability. 
 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, originally enacted in 
1946 and amended substantially in 1988, provides in relevant part 
that: 
 [a]ny person who, on or in connection with 
any goods or services . . . uses in commerce 
any word, term, name, symbol or device . . . 
or any false designation of origin, false or 
misleading description of fact, or false or 
misleading representation of fact which . . . 
is likely to deceive as to the affiliation, 
connection or association of such person with 
another person, or as to origin, sponsorship 
or approval of his or her goods, services, or 
commercial activities by another person . . . 
shall be liable in a civil action by any 
person who believes that he or she is or is 
likely to be damaged by such act. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).  By containing such broad language, the Act 
  
"proscribes not only trademark infringement in its narrow sense, 
but more generally creates a federal cause of action for unfair 
competition."  Duraco Prods., Inc., slip op. at 12; American 
Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1140 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (citing Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 691 F.2d 
168, 172 (3d Cir. 1982)); see also 3 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy 
on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, §27.02[1] at 27-13 
(hereinafter "McCarthy on Trademarks").  In order to succeed on 
its claim, AT&T must prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that: 
 (1) Winback uses a false designation of origin, as 
defined in the Act; 
 (2) That such use of a false designation occurs in 
interstate commerce in connection with goods and services;  
 (3) That such false designation is likely to cause 
confusion, mistake or deception as to the origin, sponsorship, or 
approval of Winback's goods or services by another person; and 
 (4) That AT&T has been or is likely to be damaged. 
See 3 McCarthy on Trademarks, § 27.03[1][a] at 27-21.9 
                     
9
.  AT&T's allegations are an amalgam of a classic section 43(a) 
claim alleging misuse of a mark, a claim of false advertising 
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(2), and a claim of passing off. 
In the false advertising area, we have held that a plaintiff must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence: 
 
 '(1) that the defendant has made false or 
misleading statements as to his own product 
[or another's]; (2) that there is actual 
deception or at least a tendency to deceive a 
substantial portion of the intended audience; 
(3) that the deception is material in that it 
is likely to influence purchasing decisions; 
  
 This appeal focuses on a subset of the first prong of 
the test:  whether Winback falsely designated the origin of its 
services.  AT&T does not argue that Winback directly infringed on 
its rights.  Rather, AT&T bases its claim for relief upon the 
actions of Winback's sales representatives.  It contends that 
under common law theories of agency including the doctrine of 
apparent authority, Winback is liable for the infringing actions 
of its sales representatives.  Winback disclaims any 
responsibility for its sales representatives, over whom they 
claim to have little control. 
(..continued) 
(4) that the advertised goods travelled in 
interstate commerce; and (5) that there is a 
likelihood of injury to the plaintiff in 
terms of declining sales, loss of good will, 
etc.' 
 
Johnson & Johnson-Merck, 19 F.3d at 129 (quoting U.S. Healthcare, 
Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 922-23 
(3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 816, 111 S.Ct. 58 (1990) 
(quoting Max Daetwyler Corp. v. Input Graphics, Inc., 545 F. 
Supp. 165, 171 (E.D. Pa. 1982)).  In cases alleging unprivileged 
imitation of the plaintiff's marks, a plaintiff must prove "(1) 
that the imitated feature is non-functional, (2) that the 
imitated feature has acquired a 'secondary meaning,' and (3) that 
consumers are likely to confuse the source of plaintiff's product 
with that of defendant's product."  American Home Prods. Corp. v. 
Barr Lab., Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 370 (3d Cir. 1988) (citation 
omitted).  A claim of passing off generally focuses solely on the 
likelihood of the customers' confusion, and involves a comparison 
between the two products.  The essence of AT&T's claims is not 
that the defendants misled customers purely by misuse of the AT&T 
initials and the AT&T globe, but that by a series of 
misrepresentations -- including oral representations, misleading 
use of AT&T's marks, and misleading description of Winback's name 
-- the defendants confused end-user customers into believing 
Winback was affiliated with AT&T.  Thus, none of the tests 
outlined in this footnote adequately captures the essence of 
AT&T's claims.  The test we employ is geared to the factual 
situation of this case. 
  
 The statute, by referring to "any person" who infringes 
on a plaintiff's rights, is silent as to the existence, or the 
scope, of vicarious liability; the statutory language is directed 
solely at the infringers themselves.  Thus, we are called upon to 
examine whether the statute permits us to look beyond its 
contours at all.  See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. 
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., ____ U.S. ____, ____, 114 
S.Ct. 1439, 1446 (1994) ("With respect [to] the scope of conduct 
prohibited by [a statute], the text of the statute controls our 
decision."); Electronic Lab. Supply Co. v. Cullen, 977 F.2d 798, 
806 (3d Cir. 1992) ("'Where a statute specifically limits those 
who may be held liable for the conduct described by the statute, 
the courts cannot extend liability . . . to those who do not fall 
within the categories of potential defendants described by the 
statute.'") (quoting In re Equity Corp. of America Sec. Litig., 
416 F. Supp. 161, 181 (C.D. Cal. 1976)).  The questions to be 
addressed are (1) whether the district court was correct in 
importing common law doctrines into section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act and (2) if so, whether the district court properly applied 
those doctrines. 
 
 2.  The effect of Central Bank 
 Generally, "the applicability of common law doctrines 
in litigation under federal statutes depends on whether those 
principles advance the goals of the particular federal statute 
which plaintiffs allege has been violated."  Petro-Tech, Inc. v. 
Western Co. of North America, 824 F.2d 1349, 1356 (3d Cir. 1987) 
  
(citing American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 
456 U.S. 556, 570, 102 S.Ct. 1935, 1944-45 (1982)); O'Neil v. 
Q.L.C.R.I., Inc., 750 F. Supp. 551, 555 (D.R.I. 1990).  Of 
course, the days of a general federal common law have long since 
passed, see Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78, 58 S.Ct. 
817, 822 (1938), and courts should be wary about looking outside 
of the statute itself to expand the scope of liability, lest they 
accurately be accused of legislating from the bench.  Cf. Stomper 
v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 241, 27 F.3d 316, 319 (7th 
Cir. 1994) ("Once Congress has legislated, the common-law rules 
courts apply to fill interstices fall away.").  Thus, when a 
statute is self-contained, the scope of our interpretation is 
constrained by the statutory language itself.  See, e.g., Central 
Bank, ____ U.S. at ____, 114 S.Ct. at 1447.  Nonetheless, when 
the importation of common law doctrines will advance the goals of 
the statute, courts may utilize the doctrines, provided the 
courts "conform [the] implied remedies to the rules Congress 
devised for the remedies it authorized expressly."  Stomper, 27 
F.3d at 319. 
 Winback implicitly argues that if we import the 
doctrines of agency and apparent authority into the statute, we 
would be violating this settled rule of construction and that we 
would be legislating in areas where Congress has failed to act.  
Therefore, Winback concludes, AT&T's argument more properly is 
made to Congress rather than to the courts.10  It relies for this 
                     
10
.  It does not appear that Winback raised this argument before 
the district court.  The district court noted that "[Winback] and 
  
proposition on Central Bank, a recent Supreme Court case refusing 
to find parties liable for aiding and abetting the violation of a 
federal securities statute. 
 In Central Bank, the Supreme Court considered whether 
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 
"Exchange Act"), which has been held to create a private cause of 
action against parties who "commit a manipulative or deceptive 
act in connection with the purchase of or sale of securities . . 
. extends as well to those who do not engage in the manipulative 
or deceptive practice but who aid and abet the violation."  Id. 
at ____, 114 S.Ct. at 1443.  Examining the language of the 
statute, as well as the Court's own tendency to construe narrowly 
the scope of conduct prohibited by the Exchange Act, the Court 
concluded that an action cannot be maintained for aiding and 
abetting securities fraud:  "[T]he statute prohibits only the 
making of a material misstatement (or omission) or the commission 
of a manipulative act [and this] proscription does not include 
giving aid to a person who commits a manipulative or deceptive 
act."  Id.     , 114 S.Ct. at 1148. 
(..continued) 
Inga do not dispute the applicability of the common law of 
agency."  Winback, 851 F. Supp. at 624.  On this appeal, however, 
Winback states that "[i]t is the position of the defendants that 
the Lanham Act permits neither vicarious liability nor aiding and 
abetting liability."  Appellee's brief at 34.  It also writes: 
"The statute covers only primary liability.  It does not include 
vicarious liability, respondeat superior liability or aiding and 
abetting liability.  The defendants have not been accused 
personally of violating the statute and cannot be held liable 
under it.  This case is as simple as that."  Id. at 37.  At oral 
argument, Winback explicitly made this argument.  AT&T does not 
contend that Winback waived this argument by failing to raise it 
before the district court.  Thus, we address it on the merits. 
  
 The language of Central Bank is undeniably broad, and 
the dissent warned that other mechanisms of common law secondary 
liability -- such as "respondeat superior and other common-law 
agency principles" -- may not survive the majority's construction 
of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.  Id. at ____, 114 S.Ct. at 
1460 n.12 (Stevens, J. dissenting).  Nonetheless, we do not 
believe that the Court's restrictive reading of the Exchange Act 
impacts on the determination of the scope of liability under the 
Lanham Act. 
 In Central Bank, the Supreme Court primarily was 
concerned with broadening the range of unlawful conduct beyond 
that specifically proscribed by the Act.  As the Court framed the 
issue, aiding and abetting constituted a separate cause of 
action, and in order to find such liability, the Court would have 
to imply a private right of action under the statute beyond that 
which already had been implied.  See id. at     , 114 S.Ct. at 
1447 ("statutory text controls the definition of conduct covered 
by § 10(b) [and] 'the language of Section 10(b) does not in terms 
mention aiding and abetting.'") (quoting Brief for Securities and 
Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 8).  Thus, the Court saw 
the case as involving another in a series of attempts by 
plaintiffs and the SEC to broaden the statute to prohibit conduct 
simply not covered by the actual statutory language.  See, e.g., 
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235, 100 S.Ct. 1108, 
1118 (1980) ("When an allegation of fraud [under section 10(b)] 
is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty 
to speak"); Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476, 97 
  
S.Ct. 1292, 1302 (1977) (statute does not prohibit "a breach of 
fiduciary duty by majority stockholders, without any deception, 
misrepresentation, or nondisclosure" because such an act is not 
manipulative or deceptive conduct); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 
425 U.S. 185, 201, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 1384-85 (1976) (refusing to 
expand scope of liability under section 10(b) of Securities 
Exchange Act beyond knowing or intentional misconduct).  Once 
again, the Court simply refused to expand "the scope of conduct 
prohibited by the statute."  Central Bank, ____ U.S. at ____, 114 
S.Ct. at 1453. 
 The Supreme Court's wariness therefore rested on the 
nature of aiding and abetting liability itself.  And in fact, 
aiding and abetting liability is not a well-settled mechanism for 
imposing civil liability.  Rather, "[a]iding and abetting 
liability traditionally applies to criminal offenses", see 
Electronic Lab. Supply Co., 977 F.2d at 805; Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d 
at 1356.  While it has been borrowed in certain civil contexts, 
"[p]recedent, except in the securities area, is largely confined 
to isolated acts of adolescents in rural society."  Halberstam v. 
Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (also quoted in Central 
Bank, ____ U.S. at ____, 114 S.Ct. at 1450).  This is because 
aiding and abetting liability, with its focus on the defendant's 
substantial and knowing assistance to the commission of a tort, 
rests by definition upon acts that encourage a tort rather than 
acts constituting the tort.  See, e.g., Halberstam, 705 F.2d at 
481-86 (canvassing aiding and abetting tort cases).  By 
definition then, the act rendered unlawful under an aiding and 
  
abetting theory is different than the act rendered unlawful by 
the underlying tort. 
 By contrast, courts imposing liability on agency 
theories are not expanding the category of affirmative conduct 
proscribed by the relevant statute; rather, they are deciding on 
whose shoulders to place responsibility for conduct indisputably 
proscribed by the relevant statute.  The principal is held liable 
not because it committed some wrongdoing outside the purview of 
the statute which assisted the wrongdoing prohibited by the 
statute, but because its status merits responsibility for the 
tortious actions of its agent.  Cf. Petro-Tech, Inc., 824 F.2d at 
1356-58 (discussing aiding and abetting and vicarious liability 
separately).11  Indeed, in some instances, liability cannot be 
imposed without reference to agency principles -- a corporation 
can only act through its agents, and therefore only can be bound 
through application of agency principles. 
                     
11
.  Prosser and Keeton have this to say in a discussion of the 
basis for vicarious liability: 
 
 Since B himself has been free from all fault, 
when he is held liable to C it is in one 
sense a form of strict liability.  In another 
it is not.  The foundation of the action is 
still negligence, or other fault, on the part 
of A; and all that the law has done is to 
broaden the liability for that fault by 
imposing it upon an additional, albeit 
innocent, defendant.  It is still an action 
for negligence, and the ordinary rules of 
negligence liability are still applied to it. 
W. Page Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts, § 69 at 499 (5th ed. 
1984) (hereinafter Prosser & Keeton on Torts).  In the context of 
cases like this one, the status of the defendant is of one who 
has authorized another to conclude contracts with third parties 
and who directly profits from those contracts. 
  
 Moreover, unlike aiding and abetting liability, which 
in the federal system largely has been confined to securities 
fraud, agency doctrine, including the theory of apparent 
authority, has long been a part of the federal system.  As long 
ago as 1928, the Supreme Court applied as a matter of federal 
common law general principles of agency law.  In so doing, it 
held that "few doctrines of the law are more firmly established 
or more in harmony with accepted notions of social policy than 
that of the liability of the principal without fault of his own."  
Gleason v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co., 278 U.S. 349, 356, 49 S.Ct. 
161, 162-63 (1929).  More recently, in American Soc'y of 
Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., the Supreme Court 
began its analysis of whether apparent authority applies in the 
antitrust context with the premise that "[t]he apparent authority 
theory has long been the settled rule in the federal system."  
Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 567, 102 S.Ct. at 1943 (citing Ricketts 
v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 153 F.2d 757, 759 (2d Cir. 1946)).12  
                     
12
.  The Court stated: 
 
 In a wide variety of areas, the federal 
courts . . . have imposed liability upon 
principals for the misdeeds of agents acting 
with apparent authority.  See, e.g., Dark v. 
United States, 641 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(federal tax liability); National Acceptance 
Co. v. Coal Producers Assn., 604 F.2d 540 
(7th Cir. 1979) (common-law fraud); Holloway 
v. Howerdd, 536 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1976) 
(federal securities fraud); United States v. 
Sanchez, 521 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1975) (bail 
bond fraud), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 817, 97 
S.Ct. 59 (1976); Kerbs v. Fall River 
Industries, Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 
1974) (federal securities fraud); Gilmore v. 
  
In Hydrolevel, the Supreme Court followed the approach of the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency, and held that "a principal is 
liable for an agent's misrepresentations that cause pecuniary 
loss to a third party, when the agent acts within the scope of 
his apparent authority."  Id. at 566, 102 S.Ct. at 1942 (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 249, 262 (1957); Rutherford v. 
Rideout Bank, 80 P.2d 978 (Cal. 1938)).   
 More recently, following earlier precedents, we have 
recognized respondeat superior liability under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.  Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 450 
(3d Cir. 1994).  See also Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 
773, 780 (2d Cir.) ("an employer is liable for the 
discriminatorily abusive work environment created by a supervisor 
if the supervisor uses his actual or apparent authority to 
further the harassment, or if he was otherwise aided in 
accomplishing the harassment by the existence of the agency 
relationship"), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 114 S.Ct. 2693 
(1994).  And "[f]ederal courts have routinely applied [respondeat 
superior] principles in fair housing cases and held principals 
liable for the discriminatory acts of their agents."  City of 
Chicago v. Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Center, Inc., 982 F.2d 
1086, 1096 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 113 
S.Ct. 2961 (1993); see also Northside Realty Assocs. Inc. v. 
(..continued) 
Constitution Life Ins. Co., 502 F.2d 1344 
(10th Cir. 1974) (common-law fraud). 
 
Hydrolevel, 456 U.S. at 568, 102 S.Ct. at 1943. 
  
United States, 605 F.2d 1348, 1353-54 (5th Cir. 1979).  Thus, 
Central Bank's discussion of aiding and abetting should not be 
transplanted into the more settled realm of agency law.13 
 But beyond this, it is quite clear under Central Bank's 
reasoning, the Supreme Court was concerned with the Exchange Act 
itself under which the private right of action already had been 
judicially implied.  Accordingly, we think that the Court did not 
intend to overrule settled constructions of other statutes that 
relied on common law doctrines to determine the scope of 
liability.  See Central Bank, ____ U.S. at ____, 114 S.Ct. at 
1444 ("we pa[y] close attention to the statutory text in defining 
the scope of conduct prohibited by § 10(b)").  Thus, in contrast 
to the Court's restrictive reading of the Exchange Act, the Court 
has endorsed and applied a theory of secondary liability for 
trademark infringement that comes very close to aiding and 
abetting.  The Court first enunciated the rule over 70 years ago, 
prior to the enactment of the Lanham Act, when the Court was 
concerned with constructing and enforcing a common law of unfair 
competition.  William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 
                     
13
.  Winback also relies on Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs. of 
City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018 (1978), which held 
that a municipality could not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 under a theory of respondeat superior liability.  That case 
is clearly inapposite.  There, the Court relied not just on the 
language of the statute, but the scheme of causation that must be 
proven in order to hold a party liable.  Moreover, the Court 
relied heavily on the legislative history and the fact that 
"creation of a federal law of respondeat superior would have 
raised all the constitutional problems associated with the 
obligation to keep the peace, an obligation Congress chose not to 
impose because it thought imposition of such an obligation 
unconstitutional."  Id. at 693, 98 S.Ct. at 2037. 
  
U.S. 526, 44 S.Ct. 615 (1924).  In that case, the Court held that 
a manufacturer of a pharmaceutical product could in certain 
instances be held liable for acts of infringement by distributors 
and retailers of the product.  Relying on the general proposition 
that "[o]ne who induces another to commit a fraud and furnishes 
the means of consummating it is equally guilty and liable for the 
injury," id. at 530-31, 44 S.Ct. at 617 (citing Hostetter Co. v. 
Brueggeman-Reinert Distilling Co., 46 Fed. 188, 189 (C.C.D. Mo. 
1891)), the Court reached what it saw as a self-evident 
conclusion: an entity is liable for trademark infringement if it 
contributes to the infringement.  The theory of "contributory 
infringement", as it came to be called, survived into the 
statutory era.  As the Supreme Court explained in a case 
involving section 32 of the Lanham Act: 
 [L]iability for trademark infringement can 
extend beyond those who actually mislabel 
goods with the mark of another.  Even if a 
manufacturer does not directly control others 
in the chain of distribution, it can be held 
responsible for their infringing activities 
under certain circumstances.  Thus, if a 
manufacturer or distributor intentionally 
induces another to infringe a trademark, or 
if it continues to supply its product to one 
whom it knows or has reason to know is 
engaging in trademark infringement, the 
manufacturer or distributor is contributorily 
responsible for any harm done as a result of 
the deceit. 
 
Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854, 102 
S.Ct. 2182, 2188 (1982).  "The two elements for contributory 
infringement are thus summed up as (1) supply of a product, and 
(2) knowledge of direct infringement."  Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry 
  
Auction, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 1492, 1498 (E.D. Cal. 1994).  Of 
course, there is no reason why the doctrine should be confined in 
application to manufacturers, and indeed, other courts have 
expanded it beyond that particular origin.  See, e.g., Mini Maid 
Servs. Co. v. Maid Brigade Sys., Inc., 967 F.2d 1516, 1522 (11th 
Cir. 1992) (doctrine could hold franchisor liable for infringing 
actions of its franchisee when "franchisor explicitly or 
implicitly encouraged the trademark violations"); Hard Rock Cafe 
Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d 1143, 1149 
(7th Cir. 1992) (landlord of flea market could be liable for its 
tenant's sale of an infringing product where the landlord is 
found to have been "wilfully blind" to the infringing acts); but 
see Fonovisa, 847 F. Supp. at 1498 (refusing to apply doctrine of 
contributory infringement "to impose liability on third parties 
who have never had a traditional role in enforcing the Lanham 
Act").14 
 
 3.  Is there agency liability under section 43(a)? 
 The question, then, is whether application of agency 
theory, including the doctrine of apparent authority, would 
                     
14
.  If the doctrine of contributory infringement were the sole 
means of imposing liability for indirect conduct, AT&T would be 
without a section 43(a) remedy in this case.  As the district 
court recognized, AT&T is not proceeding under a contributory 
infringement theory.  Nor does it appear that it could.  The 
record adequately supports the district court's conclusion that 
"in the instances where [AT&T] brought objectionable acts of the 
sales representatives to the attention of Inga, Inga took 
appropriate steps to reprimand and discipline the sales 
representative."  Winback, 851 F. Supp. at 631. 
  
further the goals of the statute.  See, e.g., Hydrolevel, 456 
U.S. at 570, 102 S.Ct. at 1944.  In Hydrolevel, the Court, 
finding that "under general rules of agency law, principals are 
liable when their agents act with apparent authority and commit 
torts analogous to the antitrust violation presented by this 
case", simply looked at the policy behind the antitrust laws to 
determine whether the doctrine should be applied.  Id. at 565-66, 
570, 102 S.Ct. at 1942, 1944.  Because "apparent authority theory 
is consistent with the congressional intent to encourage 
competition", the Court applied the doctrine. Id. 
 The contributory infringement cases cited above 
demonstrate that in certain instances, secondary, indirect 
liability is a legitimate basis for liability under the federal 
unfair competition statute.  There is a good reason for this:  
the Lanham Act is derived generally and purposefully from the 
common law tort of unfair competition, and its language parallels 
the protections afforded by state common law and statutory torts.  
Thus, the conduct prohibited by section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 
is even more analogous to common law torts than the antitrust 
laws at issue in Hydrolevel.  The Act federalizes a common law 
tort.  In construing the Act, then, courts routinely have 
recognized the propriety of examining basic tort liability 
concepts to determine the scope of liability.  See, e.g., 
Electronic Lab. Supply Co., Inc., 977 F.2d at 806 (section 
34(d)(11) of Lanham Act is like a "tort" statute); Hard Rock 
Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1148 (trademark infringement is a "species of 
tort" and "we . . . have turned to the common law to guide our 
  
inquiry into the appropriate boundaries of liability"); David 
Berg and Co. v. Gatto Int'l Trading Co, Inc., 884 F.2d 306, 311 
(7th Cir. 1989) ("unfair competition and trademark infringement 
are tortious"); 3 McCarthy on Trademarks § 25.03[1] at 25-34 
("trademark infringement and unfair competition are torts").  We 
previously have held that the "federal law of unfair competition 
under § 43(a) is not significantly different from the New Jersey 
[common] law of unfair competition" and have applied the 
identical test to both claims.  American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-
Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1141 (3d Cir. 1986); see also 
American Home Prods. Corp. v. Barr Lab., Inc., 656 F. Supp. 1058, 
1061 (D.N.J. 1987) (same), aff'd, 834 F.2d 368 (3d Cir. 1987).  
Other courts have ruled similarly.  See, e.g., Words & Data, Inc. 
v. GTE Communications Servs., Inc., 765 F. Supp. 570, 579 (W.D. 
Mo. 1991) ("Missouri common law regarding unfair competition is 
coextensive with federal law"); Worthington Foods, Inc. v. 
Kellogg Co., 732 F. Supp. 1417, 1431 (S.D. Ohio 1990) ("an 
analysis appropriate for a determination of liability under 
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is also appropriate for 
determining liability under the Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices 
Act").  Therefore, because section 43(a) parallels state tort law 
and is derived from tort common law, it is self-evident that 
application of at least some tort concepts of liability will 
"advance the goals of [the Act]." Petro-Tech, Inc., 824 F.2d at 
1356. 
 Applying the analysis to the facts of this case, it is 
clear that liability based on agency principles is often 
  
appropriate.15  The Lanham Act has the broad purpose of 
"protect[ing] . . . competitors from a wide variety of 
misrepresentations of products and service . . . ."  20th Century 
Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 91 n.13 (2d 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052, 105 S.Ct. 1755 (1985).  
By expressly creating a private right of action against the 
infringer, the Act creates a "statutory tort of broad[] scope" 
that "provides a private remedy to a commercial plaintiff who 
meets the burden of proving that its commercial interests have 
been harmed by a competitor's [misrepresentations]".  Sandoz 
Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 
227, 230 (3d Cir. 1990).  Here, the parties recognize that AT&T 
has the right to sue the sales representatives under section 
43(a).  But, as Winback acknowledges, "it would be inconvenient 
for AT&T to initiate suit in separate jurisdictions against every 
independent contractor which it believes violated its 
intellectual property rights."  Appellee br. at 13-14.  The only 
feasible way for AT&T to assert its federal rights would be to 
sue the principal, who, if an agency relationship is established, 
is able to exercise at least some control over its agents, who 
authorized the sales representatives to enter into contracts on 
its behalf, and who receives direct financial benefits from those 
                     
15
.  The one case we have found that addresses this issue held 
without analysis (and apparently without dispute) that a 
principal could be held liable for the infringing acts of its 
agent acting with apparent authority.  See Dreamwerks Prod. 
Group, Inc. v. Party Masters, Inc., Br. No. 91-22949, 1992 Bankr. 
LEXIS 711 at * 47-48 (N.D. Ill. April 23, 1992). 
  
contracts.  If the Act prohibited such liability, then infringing 
actions would continue undeterred, a company would benefit from 
undeterred unlawful acts, and the statute's purpose to prohibit 
unfair competition would go unrealized.  "'[I]t would be unjust 
to permit an employer to gain from the intelligent cooperation of 
others without being responsible for the mistakes, the errors of 
judgment and the frailties of those working under his direction 
and for his benefit.'"  Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1358 (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219, comment (a) on subsection 
(1)). 
 Thus, we hold that the district court properly held 
that agency principles apply to the instant dispute.  
Nonetheless, our review of the record compels the conclusion that 
the district court erred by failing adequately to consider the 
various theories of agency under which Winback could be 
responsible for the torts of its representatives.  In particular, 
the district court should have considered (1) whether Winback is 
liable for its representatives' acts, despite the fact that the 
representatives are independent contractors and despite the 
absence of a master-servant relationship; and (2) whether the 
representatives, even if not agents, were acting with the 
apparent authority of Winback. 
   
 4.  Agency law 
  
 We now apply agency law to the facts of this case.16  
"An agency relationship is created when one party consents to 
have another act on its behalf, with the principal controlling 
and directing the acts of the agent."  Sears Mortgage Corp. v. 
Rose, 634 A.2d 74, 79 (N.J. 1993) (citing Arcell v. Ashland Chem. 
Co., 328 A.2d 53, 65 (N.J. Law Div. 1977); 2A C.J.S. Agency § 37 
(1972); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958)).  Depending 
upon the right of control capable of being exercised by the 
principal over the agent, agents are characterized either as 
servants or independent contractors.  Servants generally are 
                     
16
.  This inquiry, though, raises an additional question, of what 
law to examine.  Courts addressing Section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act have looked both to the common law of the state where the 
infringing action took place, and to general principles of 
federal common law.  See, e.g., Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1148 
("we have . . . turned to the common law to guide our inquiry 
into the appropriate boundaries of liability"); Getty Petroleum 
Corp. v. Island Transp. Corp., 862 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(declining to find right of contribution under the Lanham Act 
because "[t]here is no federal common law of contribution"), 
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006, 109 S.Ct. 1642 (1989). 
 
   In W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 (7th 
Cir. 1985), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit phrased 
the problem as follows:  If the Lanham Act provides simply "a 
federal remedy for unfair competition", the court should apply 
the common law of the relevant state.  If, however, the Act is 
interpreted as creating "a federal substantive law of unfair 
competition", then the suit is "to enforce a federal common law 
trademark, and the court is not bound to follow the common law of 
a particular state."  Id. at 338.  But in Rogers the court did 
not resolve the question.  Because of uniformity concerns 
implicated by applying different law to identical claims, 
depending on the state where the complaint is filed, we are 
inclined to favor application of general principles of federal 
common law.  Nonetheless, we need not decide this issue today, 
because in the doctrinal areas relevant to this case, New Jersey 
law is in accord with general principles of common law. 
  
employees of the principal, and are subject to physical control 
by the principal.  As one court has explained the distinction:  
 'An agent is a person who represents another 
in contractual negotiations or transactions 
akin thereto.  A servant is a person who is 
employed to perform personal services for 
another in his affairs, and who, in respect 
to his physical movements in the performance 
of the service, is subject to the other's 
control or right of control.  Persons who 
render service but retain control over the 
manner of doing it are not servants.' 
 
Sanders v. Rowan, 484 A.2d 1023, 1028 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. 1984) 
(quoting Globe Indem. Co. v. Victill Corp., 119 A.2d 423, 427 
(Md. 1956)).  Thus, if "'the employer assumes the right to 
control the time, manner, and method of executing the work, as 
distinguished from the right merely to require certain definite 
results in conformity to the contract,'" a master-servant agency 
relationship has been created.  Stewart v. Midani, 525 F. Supp. 
843, 845 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (applying Georgia law) (quoting Blair v. 
Smith, 41 S.E.2d 133, 135 (Ga. 1947)).  If, however, the agent is 
not subject to that degree of physical control, but is only 
subject to the general control and direction by the principal, 
the agent is termed an independent contractor.  Id. at 846; see 
also Nazworth v. Swire Florida, Inc., 486 So.2d 637, 638 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1986) ("'independent contractor' is a term which 
is antithetical to the word 'servant', although not to the word 
'agent'") (quoting Restatement (Second) Agency section 14(N), 
Comment (a)).  Thus, all agents who are not servants are 
"independent contractors."   Moreover, all non-agents who 
contract to do work for another are also termed "independent 
  
contractors".  For example, a person who contracts to build a 
swimming pool for another is the latter's independent contractor.  
There are, then, agent-independent contractors and non-agent 
independent contractors. 
 Such distinctions matter because the scope of the 
employer's liability for the torts of its representatives depends 
almost exclusively on how the relationship is characterized.  "If 
the principal is the master of an agent who is his servant, the 
fault of the agent, if acting within the scope of his employment, 
will be imputed to the principal by reason of respondeat 
superior."  Baldasarre v. Butler, 625 A.2d 458, 464 (N.J. 1993) 
(emphasis added) (quoting JMB Enter. v. Atlantic Employers Ins., 
550 A.2d 764, 767 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988)).  On the 
other hand, "the principal [generally] is not vicariously liable 
for the torts of the independent contractor if the principal did 
not direct or participate in them."  Baldasarre, 625 A.2d at 465 
(emphasis added); Sanders, 484 A.2d at 1028-29 ("where the agent 
is not a servant, the principal is not liable for the agent's 
negligent conduct 'unless the act was done in the manner 
authorized or directed by the principal, or the result was one 
authorized or intended by the principal.'") (citations omitted); 
Nazworth, 486 So.2d at 638 ("The general rule . . . is that an 
owner, employer, or contractee will not be held liable for the 
torts of an independent contractor or of the latter's employees 
committed in the performance of the contracted work.") (citations 
omitted).  As the New Jersey Supreme Court has explained, the 
independent contractor is "'characterized by the attributes of 
  
self-employment and self-determination in the economic and 
professional sense'".  Baldasarre, 625 A.2d at 465 (quoting Rokos 
v. State, Dep't of Treasury, 564 A.2d 1217, 1220 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1989)).  Since the employer 
 'has no right of control over the manner in 
which the work is to be done, it is to be 
regarded as the contractor's own enterprise, 
and he, rather than the employer is the 
proper party to be charged with the 
responsibility for preventing the risk, and 
administering and distributing it.' 
 
Baldasarre, 625 A.2d at 465 (quoting Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 
§ 71).  
 The district court found that the sales representatives 
are independent contractors and therefore Winback could not be 
liable for their infringing acts.  AT&T's arguments against this 
finding can be summed up as follows:  (1) the district court 
erred by failing to categorize the sales representatives as 
employees or servants of Winback; (2) the district court failed 
to consider whether the representatives were agent independent 
contractors or non-agent independent contractors; (3) the 
district court failed to consider whether Winback had created an 
apparent master-servant relationship such that Winback should be 
held liable for the torts of its sales representatives; (4) 
Winback should be held liable at any rate.  We will address these 
arguments in turn. 
 
 a.  Servants or independent contractors 
  
 In reaching its conclusion that Winback's sales 
representatives are independent contractors, the district court  
relied almost exclusively on Baldasarre.  In that case, the 
plaintiff had sought to hold a purchaser of land liable for his 
attorney's alleged misrepresentations.  In denying relief, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey reasoned: 
 Attorneys generally are not subject to their 
clients' actual control or direction.  
Indeed, most clients have an attorney because 
they are unfamiliar with the law and want an 
attorney to guide them through the 
intricacies of that field.  As professionals, 
attorneys are deemed responsible for their 
own acts, and, as in this case, most clients 
have legal recourse against the attorney and 
his law firm for their actions. 
 
Baldasarre, 625 A.2d at 465.  Therefore, the Court concluded that 
"[a]n innocent client should not be held vicariously liable for 
the wrongful conduct of his or her attorney against the 
attorney's other clients if the client does not direct, advise, 
consent to or participate in the attorney's improper conduct."  
Id. at 465.  The district court in this case analogized as 
follows: 
 [T]he level of joint activity between 
[Winback] and Inga and the sales 
representatives is similarly minimal and 
peripheral to the nuts and bolts of the 
business of marketing and promoting.  
Furthermore, as detailed above, no proof was 
submitted to the Court to establish that 
[Winback] or Inga advised, consented to or 
participated in the alleged 
misrepresentations.  Accordingly, plaintiff 
has failed to establish sufficient proof that 




851 F. Supp. at 626.   
 We hold that the district court correctly concluded 
that the sales representatives are independent contractors.  The 
district court found that Winback employs no marketing employees 
on its own, and that the sales representatives "play an integral 
role in the success of [Winback], financially and otherwise, in 
that all sales are conducted through these agencies and 
individuals."  851 F. Supp. at 626.  Nonetheless, the district 
court correctly recognized that Winback exercises minimal control 
over the manner in which the representatives perform their work, 
and no control at all even over whether the representatives 
choose to market their company.  Moreover, the representatives 
work for any number of companies at the same time, are paid 
purely based on the results they obtain, and operate their own 
businesses with their own expenses.  The fact that Winback 
attempted to police the representatives to prevent 
misrepresentations does not change our result.  "[A]n employer 
does not transform an independent contractor into a servant 
merely because he wishes to supervise the project as it 
transpires."  Brady v. Ralph Parsons Co., 520 A.2d 717, 731 (Md. 
1987). 
 Therefore, the district court properly found that the 
sales representatives were independent contractors.  However, the 
court erred by stopping at that point.  The district court failed 
  
to determine whether the sales representatives were agent-
independent contractors or non-agent independent contractors.17 
                     
17
.  The district court's failure to address this question is 
understandable in light of Baldasarre, for the case does not set 
forth explicitly the distinctions on which it relies.  A close 
reading of the case reveals, however, that the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey did not intend to eviscerate the distinction between 
agent-independent contractors and non-agent independent 
contractors.  For example, the Court quotes Prosser and Keeton on 
Torts for the proposition that an employer who hires an 
independent contractor: 
 
 'has no right of control over the manner in 
which the work is to be done, it is to be 
regarded as the contractor's own enterprise, 
and he, rather than the employer is the 
proper party to be charged with the 
responsibility for preventing the risk, and 
administering and distributing it.' 
 
Baldasarre, 625 A.2d at 465 (quoting Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 
§ 71).  But Prosser and Keeton rely in turn on the Second 
Restatement of Agency for their liability proposition, and the 
authors recognize that there are agent-independent contractors 
and non-agent independent contractors: 
 
 Since an agent who is not a servant is not 
subject to any right of control by his 
employer over the details of his physical 
conduct, the responsibility ordinarily rests 
upon the agent alone, and the principal is 
not liable for the torts which he may commit.  
There are, however, a number of situations in 
which such liability  may exist.  These 
include cases in which a tort may be based 
upon the apparent authority of the agent to 
act for his principal, or in which a tort 
such as deceit occurs in the course of a 
consensual transaction between the agent and 
the injured person.  Thus . . . a seller of 
land or goods may, in most states, be subject 
to an action of deceit for the fraud of his 
agent committed in the course of the sale. 
 
Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 70 at 508 (citing, among other 
authorities, numerous sections of the Restatement (Second) of 
  
 
 b.  Agent-independent contractors? 
 In this regard, we first must address the scope of the 
district court's findings.  Although the district court appeared 
to conclude that the representatives are non-agent independent 
contractors, a close reading of the decision reveals that the 
court actually found only that the representatives were non-
servant independent contractors.  For one thing, the court 
referred to "the distinctions between employees or agents and 
non-employees or independent contractors," implying that once a 
representative is termed an independent contractor it is by 
(..continued) 
Agency) (footnotes omitted).  Prosser and Keeton again cite the 
Restatement (Second) of Agency's proposition that 
 
 A principal is subject to liability for loss 
caused to another by the other's reliance 
upon a tortious representation of a servant 
or other agent, if the representation is: 
 
  (a) authorized; 
  (b) apparently authorized; or 
  (c) within the power of the agent to 
make for the principal. 
 
Second Restatement § 257 at 558 (cited in Prosser and Keeton, § 
70, n.70). 
 
 Moreover, to the extent that Baldasarre can be read to 
hold that independent contractors may never bind principals for 
their torts, that proposition was eviscerated the very next year 
by the same court.  In Sears Mortgage Corp., the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey held a title insurance company responsible for its 
attorney's fraud.  The Court directly relied on agency 
principles.  Sears Mortgage Corp., 634 A.2d at 83-84.  Since it 
can in no way be argued that the attorney was the title insurer's 




definition a non-agent.  Winback, 851 F. Supp. at 626.  Moreover, 
in determining that the representatives were independent 
contractors, the court used precisely the factors normally used 
to distinguish between servants and independent contractors:  the 
principal's right of physical control, the place where the 
representatives work, the method of payment, the fact that the 
representatives had their own business enterprises.  See Warren 
A. Seavey, Agency, § 84 at 142 (1964) (hereinafter "Seavey") 
("the relation of master and servant is indicated by the fact 
that the employee is given a salary and is employed for a 
considerable period; that he is using an instrumentality of the 
principal on his premises; that the work is unskilled, usually 
supervised; that the one employed does not have a distinct 
business").  
 The district court's failure to make the additional 
finding is crucial, because while generally principals are not 
liable for the torts of their independent contractors, the common 
law is littered with exceptions: 
 [T]here is a range of tortious conduct on the 
part of an agent that may bind the principal 
and subject him to liability even where the 
agent is not a servant, where the act was not 
done in the manner authorized or directed by 
the principal, and where the result was not 
authorized or intended by the principal. 
 
Sanders v. Rowan, 484 A.2d at 1029.  A principal is not generally 
liable for physical torts committed by its independent 
contractor-agent, but a principal will be held liable for the 
independent contractor-agent's misrepresentations "upon matters 
  
which the principal might reasonably expect would be the subject 
of representations, provided the other party has no notice that 
the representations are unauthorized."  Id. at 1029 (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 258); see also Nagels v. 
Christy, 330 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Mo. 1959) (principal liable for 
misrepresentations by independent contractor sales agent) (citing 
cases).  As one commentator has written: 
 Where an agent is authorized or apparently 
authorized to conduct a transaction, and the 
other party is unaware of any limitation upon 
the agent's authority, a problem similar to 
that of the limits of the scope of employment 
by a servant arises.  The difficulties are 
best seen in the cases of selling agents.  
Their principals have been held liable for 
the unauthorized and untrue statements as to 
the capacity of the machine sold, the age of 
a second-hand automobile, the construction 
and material used in building a house, the 
income from property, the amount of taxes due 
upon it, the extent of coverage of insurance, 
the intent of the manufacturer not to disturb 
a distributorship awarded by it to the 
plaintiff. 
 
Seavey, § 92 at 163.  Although liability at common law generally 
was limited to actions by the purchaser for deceit, we see no 
reason why the doctrine should not be transplanted to the area of 
unfair competition.  The basis for the common law exception is 
the injustice in allowing a principal to place agents in the 
marketplace, to allow the agents to complete contracts on the 
principal's behalf, to profit from the agents' 
misrepresentations, and then to disclaim liability for the 
agents' actions while benefitting from the fraud.  The theory 
relies on the distinction between torts of misrepresentation that 
  
benefit the defendant, and torts such as negligently injuring a 
passerby while driving a car, from which the defendant does not 
profit at all.  Moreover, as the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
noted, it is appropriate for courts to consider "awareness of the 
risk and the element of foreseeability of loss in their 
consideration of liability based on agency principles."  Sears 
Mortgage Corp., 634 A.2d at 83.  Correctly characterized, then, 
the doctrine simply states a circumstance in which the principal 
justly is held responsible for the torts of its independent 
contractor-agent. 
 We hold, then, that when a principal authorizes its 
independent contractor agent to conduct and conclude a 
transaction with third parties on the principal's own behalf, and 
the principal benefits financially from the contracts, the 
principal will be liable in an action brought pursuant to section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act based on the agents' foreseeable 
infringing actions upon which it would be reasonable for the 
third party to rely, provided the third party has no notice that 
the representations are unauthorized.18 
 Of course, it would be unfair for a principal to be 
liable for all misrepresentations of its agent independent 
contractors.  Thus, we include the requirements that the 
                     
18
.  As noted above, the Restatement holds a principal liable for 
tortious representations that are authorized or apparently 
authorized.  See n.17 supra.  We believe that this terminology 
unnecessarily confuses the issues.  Therefore, we employ Seavey's 
approach and the approach of the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
Sears Mortgage Corp. and use the concept of foreseeability.  See 
typescript at 43-44 (quoting Seavey). 
  
misrepresentations be foreseeable and that reliance be 
reasonable.  In considering whether the infringing actions were 
foreseeable, the district court should consider all of the 
surrounding circumstances.  For instance, if the principal went 
to great lengths to ensure that the agents knew not to make 
certain representations, such representations, if made, may be 
found to be unforeseeable.  But if, at the same time, the 
principal gave the agents carte blanche to hold themselves out as 
the principal itself, then such infringing actions may become 
foreseeable, notwithstanding the principal's efforts at policing 
the agents.  The point, of course, is to hold the principal 
liable when it is just to do so, but still to encourage the 
principal to police the agents enough so as to avoid liability.  
This is the type of balancing the district court must undertake 
in the first instance. 
 Professor Seavey's cautionary observations about 
reliance are also apt: 
 It is difficult to suggest a limitation upon 
the power of a selling agent to bind the 
principal if the statements are relevant to 
the transaction which the agent is authorized 
to conduct. . . A working rule would be the 
limitation of liability to statements 
concerning matters as to which the principal 
might think the agent, or any agent, might 
misrepresent in forwarding their joint 
interests.  There must be limits.  The seller 
of a New England farm should not be liable to 
a credulous buyer for tort damages if the 
agent were to represent that the land to be 
sold contained oil or gold. 
 
Seavey, § 92 at 164.   
  
 Because the district court failed to address whether 
the representatives were agents or non-agents, and therefore 
failed to consider these questions, we must remand the case for 
further fact findings and renewed application of the law to the 
facts.  Upon remand, then, the district court first must 
determine whether the sales representatives were agent-
independent contractors or non-agent independent contractors.  
The Restatement defines a non-agent independent contractor as 
follows: 
 A person who contracts to accomplish 
something for another or to deliver something 
to another, but who is not acting as a 
fiduciary for the other is a non-agent 
contractor.  He may be anyone who has made a 
contract and who is not an agent.  The term 
is used colloquially to describe builders and 
others who have contracted to accomplish 
physical results not under the supervision of 
the one who has employed them to produce the 
results.   
 
Restatement (Second) Agency § 14N, Comment (b).  Thus, the 
district court should assess whether the representatives are 
analogized better to a firm that contracts to perform a 
particular, discrete task, such as to build a swimming pool, or 
to a party who is empowered to speak for another and bind the 
other in contracts.  In making this determination, the facts 
analyzed by the district court and adduced at the hearing are 
certainly relevant.  While the district court should focus on the 
level of control exercisable by Winback over the manner in which 
the sales representatives market its product, it should not 
emphasize physical control (as it properly did in considering 
  
whether the representatives were servants).  Inga's testimony 
that he attempts to police the representatives is certainly 
relevant to this inquiry, particularly if Winback authorizes the 
agents to represent themselves as Winback.19  If the district 
court finds that the sales representatives are agents, it then 
must proceed to determine whether they committed infringing acts 
and whether, under the test we detailed above, Winback and Inga 
may be held liable.  If the district court determines that the 
representatives are non-agent independent contractors, it still 
must consider whether they were acting with apparent authority to 
make the representations. 
 
 c.  Apparent authority 
 The district court did not consider whether the sales 
agents were acting with apparent authority, or as apparent 
servants.  The district court discounted AT&T's arguments because 
it believed that the doctrine of apparent authority only comes 
into play when an actual agency relationship is established.  
Winback, 851 F. Supp. at 629.  The district court's premise was 
incorrect.  "Apparent authority arises in those situations where 
                     
19
.  It could be argued that our decision encourages parties like 
Winback to exercise as little control as possible over their 
representatives.  We see little danger of that, though.  For one 
thing, we cannot conceive that in a situation where the 
representative is empowered to speak as the principal, where the 
representative has the power to conduct and conclude 
transactions, and where the principal inevitably will exercise 
control over how its company is represented to third parties, a 
non-agency relationship will be found.  Moreover, once an agency 
is created, the principal may attempt to avoid liability by 
acting in a manner that makes misrepresentations unforeseeable.   
  
the principal causes persons with whom the agent deals to 
reasonably believe that the agent has authority" despite the 
absence of an actual agency relationship.  Barticheck v. Fidelity 
Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 680 F. Supp. 144, 148-49 (D.N.J. 
1988) (applying New Jersey law).  As the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit has explained: 
 If the principal is responsible for the third 
person believing that the person with whom 
she deals is an agent, or if the principal 
should realize that his conduct is likely to 
induce such belief, then there is an agency 
created by apparent authority and the 
principal will be held responsible for the 
torts of his agent. 
 
Roberts v. Montgomery Ward and Co., Inc., No. 83-1115, 729 F.2d 
1462 at *3 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 1984).  In short, apparent 
authority may be a way of creating an agency relationship. 
Under the doctrine, liability is imposed "not as the result of 
the reality of a contractual relationship but rather because of 
the actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading 
the public into believing that the relationship or the authority 
exists."  Arthur v. St. Peters Hosp., 405 A.2d 443, 446 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).  Thus, while "[the] doctrine generally 
presupposes the existence of a principal-agent relationship . . . 
it is not necessary to the application of the doctrine."  Shadel 
v. Shell Oil Co., 478 A.2d 1262, 1264 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1984); see also Sears Mortgage Corp., 634 A.2d at 79 ("[e]ven if 
a person is not an 'actual agent,' he or she may be an agent by 
virtue of apparent authority based on manifestations of that 
  
authority by the principal.") (citing C.B. Snyder Realty Co. v. 
National Newark Banking Co., 101 A.2d 544, 548 (N.J. 1953)). 
 The fact, then, that Winback's sales representatives 
actually may have been non-agent independent contractors does not 
dispose of the question.  Rather, "[a]ny inter se arrangement 
between [Winback and its sales representatives] establishing a 
relationship other than that of principal and agent is 
unimportant in determining the existence of apparent authority.  
The crucial question is what representations were made to the 
third party . . . ."  Amritt v. Paragon Homes, Inc., 474 F.2d 
1251, 1252 (3d Cir. 1973) (applying Virgin Islands law).  Thus, 
although "when dealing with an independent contractor, no 
[master/servant] relationship exists, . . . this relationship is 
not necessary to the application of the doctrine."  Arthur, 405 
A.2d at 446. 
 Under the doctrine of apparent authority, the district 
court should have looked to the principal's actions and the third 
parties' reasonable beliefs.  AT&T contends that Winback 
authorized its sales agents to conduct transactions as though 
they were Winback.  If this is true, then the district court may 
find that Winback held its representatives out to the public as 
its servants or as itself, and that the third parties reasonably 
relied on that relationship in deciding to enter into contracts, 
and, therefore, that the misrepresentations were authorized by 
Winback.  In other words, Winback may have created an agency 
under the theory of apparent authority, and Winback may be liable 
for the misrepresentations.  Because the district court made no 
  
findings in this regard, we must remand the case for additional 
fact-finding.20 
 
 d.  AT&T's final secondary liability argument 
 Finally, AT&T appears to argue that Winback should be 
liable as a matter of law for the torts of its sales 
representatives, regardless of whether they are agents and 
regardless of whether they acted with apparent authority.  AT&T 
continually refers in its brief to the inequities of the district 
court's decision.  But the law it cites to support this broad 
theory of secondary liability exists in copyright cases.21  The 
                     
20
.  When a plaintiff relies on apparent authority, it also must 
establish that the third party relied on the agency relationship 
in making its purchasing decision.  Sears Mortgage Corp., 634 
A.2d at 82.  In this regard, Winback argues that the 
representatives held themselves out as AT&T and not as Winback.  
The district court held that "[t]he proofs before the Court are 
extremely unclear as to whether or not the sales representatives 
hold themselves out to be [Winback] in making the solicitations 
or whether or not [Winback] knowingly permits its name to be used 
in the course of solicitations without qualification from the 
representatives that they are independent marketing agencies 
engaged to sell and promote the Winback program on behalf of 
[Winback]."  Winback, 851 F. Supp. at 628 n.5.  Because these 
questions are crucial in this case -- in order to determine not 
only reliance, but also the extent to which the principal held 
the representatives out to the public as its alter ego -- the 
district court may wish to hear additional evidence upon remand. 
21
.  Along with citing the copyright cases, AT&T points to the 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in First Nat'l Bank of 
Cicero v. Lewco Sec. Corp., 860 F.2d 1407 (7th Cir. 1988).  AT&T 
argues in its brief: 
 
 "As one Court said, 
 
  where the principal cannot embrace a 
transaction except through the acts of 
an unsupervised agent, the principal 
  
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has summed up the law in 
these cases as follows: 
 [A] defendant is vicariously liable for 
copyright infringement if it has 'the right 
and ability to supervise the infringing 
activity and also has a direct financial 
interest in such activities.'  Gershwin 
Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists 
Management, Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d 
Cir. 1971); F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. v. 
National Conf. of Catholic Bishops, 466 F. 
Supp. 1034, 1040 (N.D. Ill. 1978); see also 
Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, 
Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir. 
1929) (owner of dance hall liable for 
copyright violations by band hired to 
entertain paying customers); Famous Music 
(..continued) 
must accept the consequences of the 
agent's misconduct because it was the 
principal who allowed the agent to 
operate without accountability. 
 
  Courts have found an agent to be a sole 
actor for his principal when 'the whole 
procedure . . . was entrusted by [the 
principal] to the initiation and 
execution of the agent . . .'" 
 
AT&T brief at 30 (quoting Cicero, 860 F.2d at 1417-18).  AT&T 
continues:  "Yet that is exactly what Winback has done here.  
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a situation where a 
representative shoulders responsibility more completely for the 
promotional marketing of its principal than a Winback 
representative, for Winback's agents are entrusted with the 
entire marketing responsibility for Winback."  AT&T brief at 30.  
AT&T fails to mention that the court's holding was predicated on 
a finding that the agent was an adverse agent.  See Cicero, 860 
F.2d at 1417 ("Where an adverse agent is also the sole 
representative of the principal in the transaction in question, 
the principal may . . . be charged with the agent's knowledge.") 
(citing 3 W. Fletcher, Corporations § 827 at 153-62 (1975)).  The 
court explained that "[t]he adverse agent exception . . . comes 
into play where the agent's interests are shown to be adverse to 
those of his principal."  Id.  AT&T does not even attempt to 
argue that Winback's representatives were adverse agents; 
therefore, AT&T's reliance on Cicero is misplaced. 
  
Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & 
Breeding Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1213, 1215 (1st Cir. 
1977) (owner of racetrack liable for 
copyright violations by company hired to 
supply music over public address system).  
The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent an 
entity that profits from infringement from 
hiding behind undercapitalized 'dummy' 
operations when the copyright owner 
eventually sues.  Shapiro, Bernstein, 316 
F.2d at 309. 
 
Hard Rock Cafe, 955 F.2d at 1150.  AT&T's theory would go well 
beyond agency theory, for it would not rely on situations where 
the agent is acting on behalf of the principal or as the 
principal's alter ego.  AT&T's argument -- which attempts to have 
secondary liability under the Lanham Act parallel secondary 
liability under the copyright laws -- is remarkable in light of 
the fact that the Supreme Court has rejected precisely this 
argument. The Court explicitly has held that secondary liability 
for trademark infringement must be drawn more narrowly than 
secondary liability for copyright infringement.  Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19, 
104 S.Ct. 774, 787 n.19 (1984).  The Court made that statement 
while observing the "'fundamental differences between copyright 
law and trademark law.'"  Id. (internal quotation and citations 
omitted).  To adopt AT&T's argument would entail ignoring the 
Supreme Court's warning, and would require us to base secondary 
liability on a theory that goes beyond any common law doctrine of 
vicarious liability.22  We decline to do so. 
                     
22
.  AT&T also argues that Winback should be held liable under 
the "joint tortfeasor" test enunciated in Hard Rock Cafe.  In 
that case, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that 
  
 
 5.  Likelihood of confusion 
 The district court, in addition to holding that Winback 
could not be held liable for the acts of its sales agents, stated 
that "[t]he Court need not rest solely on its determination that 
the sales representatives are independent contractors in denying 
plaintiff's application."  Winback, 851 F. Supp. at 630.  Rather, 
while "plaintiff submitted sufficient proofs to the Court to 
establish that consumers have been confused by certain oral 
misrepresentations made by and written documents provided by the 
Winback sales representatives", nonetheless, "the proofs also 
establish that the cause of such confusion is not solely 
attributable to the sales representatives."  Id.  AT&T argues 
that the district court ignored unassailable evidence that 
customers were likely to be confused by the representations.  
Winback, relying on a recent case we decided, contends that the 
test is not "likelihood of confusion" but "actual confusion."  
(..continued) 
a party may be held liable for the tortious acts of another when 
"the defendant and the infringer have an apparent or actual 
partnership, have authority to bind one another in transactions 
with third parties or exercise joint ownership or control over 
the infringing product."  955 F.2d at 1150.  AT&T's argument is 
meritless.  The essence of joint tortfeasor liability is fault -- 
"[j]oint tortfeasors are all persons who act in concert to commit 
a tort, pursuant to a common purpose."  McCarthy on Trademarks, § 
25.03[1] at 25-35.  Winback and its representatives did not act 
pursuant to a common plan to commit the tortious act, and Winback 
did not actively take part in the tort, or induce or encourage 
the tort. Id.  Moreover, Winback and its representatives clearly:  
(1) are not partners, (2) do not have the authority to bind each 
other, and (3) do not exercise joint control over Winback's 
product.   
  
Since, according to Winback, AT&T submitted insufficient 
statistical proofs of actual confusion, Winback contends that the 
district court's judgment should be affirmed on this alternative 
ground. 
 While both parties argue about whether the district 
court's finding was clearly erroneous, it appears that the 
district court actually made no such finding.  The court states 
in its Opinion: 
 The Court does not intend to suggest, 
however, that either the nature of the 
product or the arguably unwise decisions of 
the AT&T marketing department would justify 
acts of infringement by [Winback] or those 
who market the [Winback] product.  Indeed, 
the Court makes no determination as to the 
primary cause of the actual confusion which 
was proven to exist.  The Court only raises 
these issues to support its conclusion that 
the issuance of a preliminary injunction in 
this matter, which would require a finding of 
likelihood of confusion, would be improper 
given that certain decisions by the plaintiff 
played at lease some substantive role in the 
creation of the confusion. 
 
Id. at 631 (emphasis added).  Thus, the court actually refrained 
from finding for Winback on the likelihood of confusion test 
alone.  Rather, it simply held that AT&T's contribution to the 
confusion supported the already-made decision that it was not 
entitled to injunctive relief.23  Since the court did not make 
                     
23
.  Our reading of the Opinion is further corroborated by the 
fact that the court cited no case law in its discussion of 
likelihood of confusion and the fact that in another place in the 
Opinion, the court held that "[t]here is no question that [AT&T] 
 submitted sufficient proofs to the Court to establish that 
consumers have been confused by certain oral misrepresentations 
made by and written documents provided by the Winback sales 
  
any express finding in this regard, we will decline to weigh the 
evidence in the first instance.  Rather, upon remand, if the 
district court reaches this issue, it should make the appropriate 
findings. 
 Still, Winback argues that we should adopt the "actual 
confusion" standard we apply in claims of false advertising and 
that we should hold as a matter of law that AT&T's evidence does 
not satisfy the test.  In a claim of trademark infringement under 
the Lanham Act, "[p]roof of actual confusion is not necessary; 
likelihood of confusion is all that need be shown.'"  Fisons 
Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466, 472 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 
930 F.2d 277, 292 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, ____ U.S. ____, 112 
S.Ct. 373 (1991)).  In considering whether a plaintiff has 
demonstrated likelihood of confusion, district courts generally 
are to consider the following factors: 
 (1) the degree of similarity between the plaintiff's 
mark and the alleged infringing mark; 
 (2) the strength of the plaintiff's mark; 
 (3) the price of the goods and other factors indicative 
of the care and attention expected of customers when making a 
purchase; 
 (4) the length of time the defendant has used the mark 
without evidence of actual confusion; 
(..continued) 
representatives."  851 F. Supp. at 630 (emphasis added).  See 
typescript at 11. 
  
 (5) the intent of the defendant in adopting the mark; 
 (6) the evidence of actual confusion; 
 (7) the extent to which the targets of the parties' 
sales efforts are the same.  
Resorts Int'l, Inc. v. Greate Bay Hotel and Casino, 830 F. Supp. 
826, 835 (D.N.J. 1992); American Home Prods. v. Barr Lab., 656 F. 
Supp. at 1068.  Of course, when the claim involves allegations 
beyond use of a similar mark, the test should be broadened 
accordingly.  Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research and Dev., 
Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 We apply a different test for claims of false 
advertising pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B). A party 
seeking relief under this section of the Lanham Act 
 bears the burden of proving actual deception 
by a preponderance of the evidence. . . . 
[I]t cannot obtain relief by arguing how 
consumers could react; it must show how 
consumers actually do react. 
 
Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 
222, 228-29 (3d Cir. 1990); see also Johnson & Johnson-Merck v. 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 19 F.3d at 130.24   Thus, the plaintiff must 
adduce evidence that "the public was actually misled or confused 
by it."  Fisons Horticulture, Inc., 30 F.3d at 472 n.8 (citing 
Johnson & Johnson-Merck, 19 F.3d at 129-30);  
Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp., 902 F.3d at 228-29.  "[T]he success 
of the claim usually turns on the persuasiveness of a consumer 
                     
24
.  If the plaintiff proves that the advertising is literally 
false, and not just misleading, then it need not prove actual 
deception. 
  
survey."  Johnson & Johnson-Merck, 19 F.3d at 129-30 (citation 
omitted).  In Johnson & Johnson-Merck, we held that a survey 
demonstrating that 7.5% of consumers were deceived was 
insufficient to satisfy plaintiff's burden that the advertising 
"tends to deceive or mislead 'a substantial portion of the 
intended audience.'"  Id. at 133-34 (quoting U.S. Healthcare, 
Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, 898 F.2d 914, 922 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 816, 111 S.Ct. 58 (1990)).  If that 
test were applied to this case, unless the district court found 
that the defendants' representations were actually false, AT&T 
would be unable to meet the standard.  Thus, the question is 
whether AT&T's claims against Winback and Inga are analogous 
enough to a claim of false advertising to warrant the same test.  
 AT&T's claims against the defendants can be divided 
into two categories:  (1) Winback's representatives brazenly and 
falsely represented Winback to be, or to be a division of, AT&T; 
(2) Winback's representatives engaged in misleading 
representations, such as designating itself as the Winback and 
Conserve Program rather than the Winback and Conserve Program, 
Inc., that misled customers into believing that Winback was 
affiliated with AT&T.  In some sense, AT&T's claims are analogous 
to claims of false advertising. See, e.g., 3 McCarthy, § 
27.08[1](c) at 27-90 ("A variation on the false advertising prong 
of § 43(a) is presented in cases finding a violation in the false 
representation that a product is created, designed, or authorized 
by plaintiff.") (collecting cases).  The similarity stems from 
  
the fact that advertising is a subset of marketing, and AT&T 
takes issue with Winback's methods of marketing. 
 But all claims of unfair competition, including claims 
of trademark infringement, are to some degree related to claims 
of false advertising.  They all involve allegations that the 
public was misled into purchasing a particular entity's product.  
But a Lanham Act claim of false advertising is different because 
in the usual such case, a plaintiff is claiming to be injured 
because of false representations by the defendant about the 
strength or quality of the defendant's own product.  Thus, the 
plaintiff essentially is claiming relief based on an indirect 
injury.  In a false designation of origin claim, however, the 
plaintiff claims relief because of false representations made by 
the defendant about the plaintiff's product.  Thus, we previously 
have held that "[l]ikelihood of confusion is . . . the test for 
actions brought under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a)(1)(A) for unfair competition to prevent false 
representations as to the source or origin of goods or services 
by a mark confusingly similar to one already in use."  Fisons 
Horticulture, Inc., 30 F.3d at 473 (citing Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. 
v. Suntan Research & Dev. Inc., 656 F.2d at 192).  We now adopt 
that test not only for false designation of origin claims that 
allege use of a confusingly similar mark, but also more general 
false designation of origin claims.  See Universal Money Centers, 
Inc. v. AT&T, 22 F.3d 1527, 1529-30 (10th Cir. 1994) (test for 
false designation of origin claim is likelihood of confusion) 
(citing Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 
  
1484 (10th Cir. 1987)) (petition for cert. filed Sept. 8, 1994); 
Smith Fiberglass Prods., Inc. v. Ameron, Inc., 7 F.3d 1327, 1329 
(7th Cir. 1993) (test for false designation of origin and palming 
off claim is "likelihood of consumers in the relevant market 
confusing the infringer's mark with that of the complainant").  
Cf. Conopco, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., No. 92-1412, 1994 WL 
511280 at *7 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 21, 1994) (noting, in different 
context, distinction between false advertising claim and false 
designation of origin claim).  Therefore, we reject Winback's 
argument and decline to affirm the district court's Order on this 
alternative ground. 
 
 III.  CONCLUSION 
 For all the reasons detailed above, we will vacate the 
district court's denial of AT&T's application for a preliminary 
injunction and we will remand the matter to the district court 
for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 
